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Abstract 
Whether it is global warming or financial crisis, more and more challenges we 
face today are increasingly of a global or transnational character. As global 
governance increasingly has been perceived as having a democratic deficit 
however, increased forms of participation by non-state actors in global 
governance processes has attracted scholarly attention. This study centres on what 
the conditions are for these practices to serve as potential entry-points for 
traditionally disempowered and marginalized social groups to influence global 
governance. Can they work in their favour?  
Drawing on a neo-gramscian perspective operative questions are derived for 
examining established practices of civil society participation in three major 
institutions of global governance; the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Having relied on 
gathering documented information and secondary sources the study finds the 
conditions not to be favourable. The narrow scope and thresholds for marginalized 
groups to access these forms of participation arguably reinforces existing 
asymmetries. While some stakeholder practices are geared for greater 
responsiveness to the concerns of marginalized group, these are not without some 
key ambiguities.  
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1 Introduction 
 From climate change to global financial crisis, more and more challenges facing 
us are global or transnational (Held 2009:542). Correspondingly they are 
increasingly determined by decision making processes at transnational levels. Yet 
there are no structures in place which conform to conventional democratic ideals 
(Steffek & Nanz 2008:1). 
 
Those that do exist, commonly referred to as global governance institutions, such 
as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB) or the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for example, often reflect power asymmetries which prevailed at the 
time of their inception (Held 2009:543). So for example, some states are 
permanent veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, and in the 
financial institutions the votes are weighted by economic contribution and 
economic size of each member.   
 
Arguably, asymmetries are not just limited to disparities between countries and 
regions. They can also reflect asymmetries between social forces mediated 
territorially through states, As trans-territorial challenges increase and political 
space expands beyond the Westphalian state (Fraser 2004), global governance 
processes marked by democratic deficit, effectively further disempowers 
marginalized groups vulnerable to effects of global challenges (Held 2009:544). 
 
After all, they are the ones who traditionally have least opportunities to make 
themselves heard. Although they may differ vastly in many respects, structural 
lack of power, and of economic as well as social opportunities to exercise their 
reasoned agency are defining features of this vulnerability (Sen 1999:xi-xii, 31) . 
 
Scholars of global governance however have noticed more complex forms of 
governance taking shape over the last decades with increased participation of 
transnational actors (TNAs) (Tallberg & Jönsson, 2010:1, Tallberg 2010:60). This 
has led some to suggest civil society participation in global governance processes, 
for example through deliberation as ways of achieving increased democratization 
(Agné 2010:177-178, Näsström 2010:201-213, Scholte 2007, Steffek & Nanz 
2008:5ff). 
 
In my view, empirical as well as research trends thus prompts the question of 
what this might entail for marginalized groups and their voice in global 
governance. Can participatory practices work in their favor?  
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1.1 Aim of the study 
The aim of the study is to account for established practices of civil society 
participation in global governance and assess the conditions for traditionally 
marginalized social groups to use these practices as an avenue to influence global 
governance.  The specific questions raised are: 
 
- What established practices of civil society engagement and participation 
are there in global governance institutions? And; 
 
- What are the conditions for these practices to serve as potential entry-
points for traditionally disempowered and marginalized social groups to influence 
global governance? 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
In the next chapter (2) I outline the wider field of research, thereafter turning to 
define suitable theoretical points of departure. In chapter 3 I subsequently describe 
how I intend to pursue the aim of the study and answer the questions posed, along 
with defining delimitations and scope. Chapter 4 presents the three institutions of 
global governance the WB, IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
which I focus on and the way in which each engages civil society. This is 
followed by analysis in Chapter 5, while the final chapter (6) presents conclusions 
and final remarks.      
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2 Research field and theory  
2.1 Related research 
Briefly looking at how some research has approached related themes, one 
noticeable focus has been on assessing degrees to which participation by Civil 
society organizations (CSOs) serve to democratize global governance (Steffek & 
Nanz, 2008, Scholte 2007).  Steffek and Nanz (2008) for example, elaborate a 
normative model for how civil society participation can mitigate democratic 
deficits by drawing on theories of deliberative democracy. 
 
The model envisages CSO participation contributing to democratization of global 
governance by acting as a transmission belt between international organizations 
(IOs) and citizens. One researcher, looking at a “most favorable case”, finds that 
responsiveness on the part of governments to CSO concerns was more evident in 
the initial phases of a policy process (Dany, 2008:53-70). 
  
The overarching conclusions include noticing increased formalized participation 
by CSOs, in part as a response to criticism over lack of legitimacy. They also find 
transparency to be a criteria in which International Organizations perform well, 
while they see deficiencies regarding access to deliberation, responsiveness and 
inclusion  (Kissling & Steffek 2008:208-238). They conclude by identifying that 
whether it is justifiable to see CSOs as transmitters of citizens concerns is a main 
concern for future research.  
 
In Jönsson & Tallberg (2010) the focus is on levels, patterns, explanations and 
implications of participation by transnational actors in global governance. They 
outline that participation and access can span between: representation, 
collaboration, consultation, information sharing and no access (Tallberg & 
Jönsson 2010:4-8).   A noticeable trend is TNAs involvement as policy experts, 
service providers, and compliance watchdogs (Tallberg 2010:45). A hypothesis 
derived from rational choice intuitionalism put forward is that these variations 
may be due to the benefits states and international institutions see in TNA 
involvement in different functions. Applied to the policy cycle, TNA involvement 
would by this account be more valued in an agenda setting phase, in relation to 
implementing programmatic services, and monitoring in an enforcement phase, 
while less so in a decision making phase. (Tallberg 2010: 50). 
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Testing such a hypothesis Steffek finds that external assistance is more sought 
after in technically complex issue areas, as highlighted in literature on epistemic 
communities (Steffek 2010:71). In contrast Steffek notes that states see little 
benefits in collaborating on issues of finance and security, central to state survival 
and where they tend to have more resources. This also ties in with Greens finding 
of limited increase in delegation of authority in areas where states incur a high 
sovereignty cost, and therefore less common in rule-making or decision-making 
(Green 2010:170-172).  
 
Jönsson & Tallberg conclude that the growth of TNA participation varies along 
the suggested lines being highest in environment and human rights areas with 
finance and security at the other end of a continuum (Jönsson & Tallberg 
2010:239-241).    
 
Along with these lines of research, there have also been normative proposals for 
improvement (See for example Scholte 2007). Meanwhile, challenging 
conventional perceptions of global governance structures Slaughter (2004) shows 
how it is not just states and supranational structures but intersecting transnational 
vertical and horizontal government networks that make up global governance. 
 
Whilst these are all fundamental research aspects of global governance providing 
crucial insights, the nature of the bodies of theories in commented research is 
reflective of the questions posed, either providing normative foundations or 
explanatory options for observed patterns. I however pose a different question.  
With this in mind, I now turn to outline suitable theoretical points of departure.   
2.2 Theoretical points of departure 
Useful perspectives highlighting power relations in international politics can be 
found in neo-gramscian approaches to international political economy (IPE). In 
these perspectives social orders are understood as based and grounded on the 
relationship of social forces, which suggests that changes in structures, are 
reflective of changes in the social relationships which underpin it (Cox 1993:64). 
This reflects a historical dialectic conceptualization, in which orders or structure 
can be seen as inherently having conflictive elements which in the social base can 
be manifested in the asymmetrical relationship between different social forces, in 
which some are subordinated and other dominant. Cox, for example, suggests that 
structural transformation can originate in these points of conflict (Cox 1995:35). 
 
In line with this understanding, global governance could effectively be seen as 
modalities of management of a social order based on the configuration of 
asymmetrical social relationships. Even if referring to classes in the same sense as 
Gramsci would be less relevant in the current context seeing how the nature of 
social conflict have changed, it can still be valid if denoting the cleavages between 
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dominant and subordinate social groups which cut across societies today (Cox 
1995:39). 
 
In an IPE perspective along these lines, this stresses the fundamental importance 
of the linkages between the economic and political domains, as well as the 
linkages between the domestic and international domains (Stubbs & Underhill 
2006:X, Krätke & Underhill 2005:32). 
 
The centrality of the linkages in relation to power and influence in matters of 
transnational and global decision-making become evident if viewed as essentially 
matters of influence and power over social life and over the production and 
distribution of wealth. The nature of some transnational issues may be more 
clearly characterized by economic interests among various stakeholders than 
others; this could for example be the case of trade issues. Nevertheless, issues 
relating to climate change are also inextricably about material values and the 
production and distribution of wealth with competing assertions.   
 
Given the intertwined nature of economic and political domains, just like the rules 
of the market economy, transnational and global issues of this kind, with its 
inherent conflicts among competing interests, are regulated through political 
resolution (Stubbs & Underhill 2006:5). 
 
In addition, if the view that has been advanced here is of a reciprocal and dialectic 
relationship between actor and structure and between social base and structure, 
power and influence in political decision-making is always going to be dependent 
on the balance of social forces as conditioned by economic interests and social 
conflicts. The mutual nature of the relationship also means that the balance 
between social forces and the character of conflicts marking their relations are in 
turn shaped by the prevailing social order.    
 
Turning to the significance of the linkages between the domestic and international 
domains, this can be appreciated more clearly if the international system is seen in 
terms of a state-society complex encompassing both the domestic and 
international levels of analysis within which the state has a central role of 
managing the constraints of both realms through domestic policy making and 
intergovernmental bargaining (Stubbs & Underhill 2006:6). 
 
Levels of analysis can be useful for analytical purposes in denoting different 
institutional levels of organization, but remain artificial divisions. As such, a 
separate and exclusive focus on the international level of analysis is many times 
not enough for an appropriate appreciation regarding issues of international 
political economy (Stubbs & Underhill 2006:5). 
 
This is stressed by Stubbs and Underhill who suggests considering “the 
international domain as reflecting the specific balance of social forces of the most 
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powerful states as this balance becomes projected into the international system” 
(Stubbs & Underhill 2006:6).    
 
In his analysis, faced with failure of revolution in the west, Gramsci’s concern 
was for how consent was secured for capitalist exploitation to prevail (Lukes 
2005:7). Centering on this issue several concepts evolved which prove useful for 
capturing salient features of discrete while still differentiated modalities of how 
social orders and structures are produced and reproduced or transformed by social 
forces through their relations at the social base of a given structure and its 
institutions.  
 
In accordance with the historicist gramscian approach his concepts cannot be 
understood as abstracts separated from their applications (Cox 1993:50). This 
means that the context in which they were brought to bear has to be borne in 
mind; while at the same time  they can nevertheless in an abductive approach, to 
the extent they prove useful, be considered in relation to other contexts.  
 
In a gramscian view social order and structures of power rooted in a social base 
may either be hegemonic or not. The distinction being the extent to which power 
is based on consent (or coercion).  A hegemonic order is one in which dominant 
forces gain the consent of subordinate groups for a given order by forming what is 
referred to as a historic bloc, in which they concede certain adjustments beneficial 
to subordinate forces and to some degree incorporate their interests in order to 
secure their consent (Cox 1993:51). The union of social forces which a historic 
bloc constitutes and which underpins a social order is therefore the basis of 
consent which produces and reproduces the hegemony of the dominant class 
through a nexus of institutions, social relations and ideas.  
 
As originally conceived, attaining a hegemonic position historically involved 
concessions to subordinate classes in return for acquiescence in bourgeois 
leadership, which in Gramsci’s analysis ultimately cleared the way for forms of 
social democracy which preserved capitalism and yet also managed to make it 
more acceptable to workers and the petty bourgeois (Cox 1993:51). 
 
However, even if the concept of power, and of hegemony as one form of power, 
as discussed here does not have to be exclusively associated with historically 
specific social classes but could be more widely considered for relations of 
dominance and subordination, it cannot be transposed to contexts in which power 
relations are addressed separate from their social basis (Cox 1993:52). 
 
This perspective means that in terms of issues related to the international realm, in 
as much as they concern relations of power and social order, and in a sense world 
order, rather than suggesting an analytical framework narrowly focused on 
relations among states, it stresses the need to direct attention to the social basis 
(Cox 1993:52).         
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As applied to the international realm, the notion of hegemony requires a 
distinction to be made between it and other common usages which in this context 
are better referred to simply as dominance.  Given this distinction it is also evident 
that there are also distinctions in periods marked by hegemony and those marked 
by mere dominance (Cox 1993:60).  
 
For Cox, historically to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and 
protect a universally conceived world order in which those states within the 
hegemons sphere could find compatibility of interests without being exploited. By 
consequence, an order along these lines can hardly be understood in inter-state 
terms alone. Instead Cox argues it could be construed as presenting opportunities 
for the forces of civil society to operate at an international scale. Understood this 
way a hegemonic concept of world order is not only premised on regulating inter-
state conflict but also on an understanding of a civil society with global reach  in 
which a global mode of production links the social classes of various countries 
(Cox 1993:61). 
 
In this respect world hegemony integrates economic and political, as well as 
social structures and is expressed in universal norms through institutions and 
mechanisms and the rules of behavior in favor of the dominant mode of 
production which these help establish, both for states and civil society forces 
acting on an international scale (Cox 1993:62).  
 
This view thus gives further basis for seeing global governance and its institutions 
as modalities of management of social order. For Cox for example, international 
organizations not only serve to develop the norms and ideology of hegemony but 
are themselves products of hegemony, or at least require the support of the 
hegemonic state, and co-opt the elites from peripheral countries as well as absorb 
counter hegemonic ideas. In this respect Cox argues that they permit adjustments 
to be made by subordinated interests with a minimum of pain. Changes, he says, 
therefore only occur to the extent they are consistent with the interests of the 
hegemonic power (Cox 1993:62-63). 
 
In this context, just as historically envisaged, Cox maintains that threats to 
hegemony in the international sphere mediated by international organizations are 
conditioned on the emergence of nascent counter hegemonic historic bloc.      
 
In Gramsci’s view, conditions of hegemony had ample implications, including 
that because the hegemony of the bourgeoisie was firmly entrenched in civil 
society, the bourgeois did not need to run the state themselves, as long as those 
who did recognized the hegemonic structures of civil society as the limits of their 
political action (Cox 1993:51). 
 
From this perception a broader view of the state under conditions of hegemony 
was derived based on that it was merely analytically useful to distinguish between 
the conventional elements of the state, such as the administrative, executive and 
  8 
coercive apparatus of government, and civil society under circumstances where 
these were constrained by the hegemony of the dominant class of a social 
formation underpinned by civil society. The argument thus being that a 
meaningful definition of the state under these circumstances would have to 
include the underpinnings of political structures in civil society, which for 
Gramsci in concrete historical terms could include the church, the educational 
system, the press and all the institutions which helped create behaviors and 
expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order (Cox 1993:51). 
 
The concept of these circumstances, in which distinguishing between civil society 
and the state  is merely  of analytical value, can for purposes of the context of this 
study be useful in pointing out that one variable in understanding the 
transformative potential of participatory features is the extent to which the civil 
society that actually participates in various forms of deliberative forums or 
arrangements can be described as constituted of counterpoint movements, or of 
groups who merely serve to reinforce the dominance of an elite citizenry in global 
governance, akin to the notion conveyed by Gramsci’s characterization of civil 
society under hegemony.  
 
In other words, seen through the lenses of the gramscian perspective, it is 
pertinent to ask whether civil society participating in deliberative forums, 
reinforces the social order in which some sectors of society are excluded by being 
part and parcel of the civil society which in gramscian terms forms the basis of the 
social order, i.e. by representing the elite citizenry that is reflected in the very 
power asymmetries of the IO’s themselves. 
 
Clearly there is a distinction to be made between the case under circumstances of 
hegemony and the context of the current problem. What is envisaged in the 
former, is that by virtue of hegemony the given social order is consented to and 
thereby entrenched in civil society, whereas the context discussed here merely 
suggests using the notion of a civil society potentially serving to reify an order to 
assess the transformative potential in civil society participation also by the extent 
to which the participants are reflective of the same power asymmetries as the 
formal structure.  
 
This also serves to remind of previous arguments, that concepts borne out of 
Gramsci’s analysis cannot be seen as abstracts in general, but attains meaning in 
connection to specific contexts in relation to which its use can be assessed, and 
the concepts meaning developed (Cox 1993:50). The concepts that are currently 
being discussed are treated as heuristic tools for interpreting, explaining and 
describing the aspects of global governance of interest in this thesis. They are not 
used as precise molds within which reality either fits perfectly or not at all. 
 
Other concepts which might also be helpful for understanding and assessing the 
transformative scope of democratic features in global governance are those of 
“passive revolution” and of “transformismo”. In gramscian analysis these 
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concepts refer to distinct modes in which dominant groups either make 
concessions which does not put the order itself into question or threaten the vital 
interests of the dominant classes, or strategies in which leaders of subordinate, 
potential counter-hegemonic forces are co-opted and the interests of other groups 
bound up with and tied into those of the dominant groups, so as to serve or be in 
line with their interests. 
 
By assessing the degree to which practices with civil society involvement in 
global governance correspond to these modes of coping with challenges to the 
interests of dominant classes, it is then also possible to gain a further nuanced 
picture of whether deliberative and participative features can be considered to 
hold transformative potential. The thinking of course being that if participatory 
practices in global governance can be described in these terms, the transformative 
potential will be limited, and the features perhaps merely represent token 
concessions in return for renewed semblance of legitimacy for the institutions 
concerned. Conversely, if these characterizations are not accurate of emerging 
practices they may instead signify bargained concessions to a “double movement” 
type of reaction of substantial meaning. 
 
In summary, the theoretical points of departure and the concepts presented here 
offer some heuristic tools for assessing if mechanisms of civil society 
participation is just “tinkering and reforms by elites” (Cox 1995:44), or if it 
represents a more profound space for change. 
 
Arguably they would suggest looking at the following aspects: 
 
A) The historical context of the emergence of the practices in each separate case 
in what is a historic approach to explanation, 
B) The extent to which participating civil society serve as counterpoint to 
institutional power asymmetries or to reify them; 
C) If by looking at the practices and their implementation they can be described 
in terms akin to the concept of “passive revolution”, and; 
D) The extent to which the practices can be viewed as cases of “transformismo”. 
 
Here a remark is warranted regarding aspect (A). As examining this aspect would 
require a historic study with another methodology, it will not form any explicit 
part of the study moving forward. For the other aspects a specific set of 
corresponding operative questions allowing for a fruitful approach in examining 
established participatory practices will be presented. 
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3 Method 
 The outlined perspective has framed the issue theoretically and offered concepts 
with which to address the question raised. Concretely the study will focus on three 
major international organizations which can reasonably be taken to constitute 
parts of global governance through their policy or regulatory role in important 
policy areas of development funding and cooperation, financial stability, as well 
as trade, impacting on the global economy as a whole. These organizations are the 
World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).   
 
These will first be presented with brief comments on the conception, purpose 
organization as well as governance and management structures of each, including 
formal decision-making. Thereafter the established practices for civil society 
participation within each organization will be presented, thereby answering the 
first question I set out. By subsequently examining key facets of these practices, 
guided by theory driven operative questions which will be outlined shortly an 
analysis in line with the second question will be made.  
 
The approach has not included gathering data through primary empirical 
observations. Instead, it has relied on extensive gathering of documented 
information on the established practices of the three institutions, given the aim of 
achieving a comprehensive view of the established practices with attention to 
coverage, as well as the sheer size of the organizations. The type of data gathered 
includes policy documents, guidelines, informational texts and factsheets, lists of 
participants at events, annual reports, thematic reports, and statistical figures.  
This has also been complemented by secondary data. 
3.1 Delimitations and choices 
Any conclusions will be limited in time and primarily to the organizations 
concerned. Moreover, lack of practical means of examining informal forms of 
engagements also sets limits. Aiming to include substantial practices to the extent 
possible I have included what I define as “established practices”, i.e. of some 
recurrence, and which are not so informal that they become very difficult to gather 
information on. This is different from “formal practices” in that it could be taken 
to mean only those set out in provisions or formal decisions by governing bodies.  
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Due to the complexity of the subject area and theory, owing to a multiplicity of 
aspects with large number of different types of variables and levels of analysis 
(Hettne 1995:13), as well as the difficulties in conducting empirical research into 
many of them within the confines of the thesis (not the least into non-state actor 
influence, See for example Karns & Mingst 2010:246-247), there has also been a 
compromise and trade-off between depth and breadth. It is nonetheless hoped that 
meaningful, if tentative, insights will be provided in an important subject-area. 
 
The choice of the three organizations is intentional. Each contributes to upholding 
an arguably distinct contentious ideological order. The WB and the IMF came 
into conception at a specific point in time when the United States had decisive 
influence in international politics which it could use to serve its perceived 
interests (Karns & Mingst 2010:258).  Each also has promoted policies which 
have produced clear dissent. In the case of the WB and IMF, conditionality 
associated with previous structural adjustment programs (SAPs), for example, 
have been highly criticized for having disproportional adverse effects on 
vulnerable and marginalized sectors of society, (See for example Stiglitz 2002, 
Karns & Mingst, 2010:400-401, 403-405) making them highly relevant in relation 
to the topic at hand.  
 
While WTO promoted free-trade may be more contentious in terms of potential 
stakeholder effects and interest, a common view used to be that owing to power 
asymmetries among members and organizational structures and processes the 
playing field was tilted against least developed countries (LDCs) (De vylder et al. 
2007, Sell 2005, Seth 2004). From a theoretical standpoint they are therefore 
viable candidates to fit the bill of a contended hegemonic order, to which the 
conceptual points of departure can be meaningfully applied. Including these three 
organizations in interrelated areas also allows for comparisons. 
3.2 Operative questions 
The key guiding theory driven operative questions by which established practices 
will been examined are: 
 
1) What can happen under these premises? What is possible? 
2) Who are they aimed at? Who do they cater to?  
3) How do they take place? 
4) What is the purpose and motive? 
5) What is the scope and scale? 
6) With what frequency? 
7) What are the requirements to participate (formal and actual)? 
8) Are there any links to policy- or decision-making? 
9) Who might take part in these practices? 
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The set of questions connects to a central aspect of neo-gramscian approaches to 
international politics - who benefits from any given order? (Gill 1993:9).  
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4 International organizations and civil                 
society participation 
4.1 The World Bank 
The World Bank was created at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) for post-war 
reconstruction and development. It has since expanded into a closely associated 
group of five institutions, the World Bank Group (WBG). The term World Bank 
(WB) however refers to IBRD and the International Development Association 
(IDA) created in 1960 (WB 2014, WB 2015a). These are the focus of the study. 
 
Nowadays the WB is a development cooperative owned by 188 member countries 
where IBRD lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-
income countries, while IDA is the largest multilateral source of concessional 
funding. It’s headquartered in Washington, but has regional and country offices. 
Its main goal is to end extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity (WB 2014).  
 
The WBs member countries are represented by a Board of Governors, the highest 
decision making body. One Governor is appointed by each country. The Board of 
Governors meets once a year with most day-to-day duties delegated to 25 
Executive Directors making up the Board of Directors. Of these, the five largest 
shareholders appoint one each while the other members are represented by elected 
Executive Directors. Votes of member countries are weighted by shares and 
economic contribution. In order to become a member, a country must first join the 
IMF. The President is responsible for overall management and chairs the meetings 
of the Board of Executive Directors (WB 2015b, WB 2015c, IBRD 2012, IDA 
1960). 
4.1.1 Civil society participation  
Civil society participation in the WB takes places in various forms, with various 
purposes at country level as well as at a global level. This is further detailed in 
what follows, while Table 1 shows a composite overview. 
 
Information disclosure 
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Information disclosure is not a form of active engagement, or participation but 
arguably a prerequisite. The WB has a policy whereby it allows access to any 
information in its possession which are not included in a clear list of exceptions, 
such as correspondence from offices of its Executive Directors, personal 
information on staff, information on corporate administrative matters for example 
on expenses and procurements. The exceptions also include attorney-client 
privileged information and information provided by member countries or third 
parties in confidence, and deliberative information. Not all information is 
published on the internet but can be requested (WB 2015d). 
 
Outreach events 
The WB together with the IMF has an outreach event called Civil Society 
Program once in the spring and once in conjunction with the annual meeting of 
the Board of Governors of the organizations, typically in the autumn. These are 
mostly held in Washington D.C. where both organizations have their head offices. 
Once every three years the Governors meeting take place in another country, and 
so does the Civil Society Program held in conjunction with it. When held in 
conjunction with the meeting of the Board of Governors it is not necessarily on 
the same premises or even on overlapping dates. At the annual meeting in the 
spring of 2015, 531 CSO representatives attended. (WB 2015e, WB 2015f, WB 
2015g). 
 
The sessions are mostly organized by participating CSOs, although lately, the 
President of the WB and the Managing Director of the IMF has participated in one 
session at each hosted event and Executive Directors in one other session. In order 
to participate CSOs have to register well in advance. To promote greater diversity 
among CSOs from developed as well as developing countries the WB and the 
IMF has during the last years offered grants to facilitate participation by CSOs 
from developing countries. These are chosen by the IMF and WB based on 
consultation with local staff in country offices. For the spring meeting in 2015, 15 
CSO leaders and think tanks from developing countries were sponsored, with an 
average of 35 being sponsored each year in the years 2010-2012 (WB 2015h, WB 
2012b). The measure taken reflects the bias of participants often representing well 
established, organized CSOs based in developed countries. A cursory overview 
for example reveals that out of 531 participants in the spring meeting 2015, 464 
were from developed countries, i.e. an overwhelming majority.  Of these 328 were 
from the United States (WB 2015g). 
 
These outreach events lack any direct link to policy or decision-making process 
and are intended to promote transparency and foster mutual understanding and 
trust, not necessarily agreement or changes in policies, according to the WB (WB 
2015f). 
 
Consultations 
The WB states that any new policy development process, including proposed new 
policies or changes to regulation as well as Country Partnership Strategies, global 
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thematic studies, and programs include consultation with stakeholders (WB 
2013). 
 
On its webpage the WB also has what it calls a consultation hub with information 
on consultations that it hosts which may be country-specific, regional or global. It 
publishes information on locations of different consultative meetings. The scope 
and length varies depending on level and context. For global consultations the 
WB may set specific meetings but it is sometimes possible to contribute online. 
Of these some concern central policy, as for example was the case when it 
adopted its policy on information access, and as is the case with a current 
consultation on its policy concerning safeguard policy for safeguarding the 
environment and the poor and vulnerable in its investments projects. These 
consultations can occur in cycles and phases whereby the WB gathers 
contribution feeding into draft proposals which again can be put forward for 
consultation authorized by the Executive Directors on specific issues in the draft 
(WB 2015i). 
 
The WB also has guidance and policy papers on stakeholder consultations in local 
investment operations. In these, the WB outline their role in obtaining the view of 
those who might be affected by development projects and their importance in 
ensuring that stakeholders concern are taken into account in decisions in which 
they typically do not have a say. The significance is considered to be greater in 
cases when people may be adversely affected. Moreover, they also serve to inform 
about changes which may affect them. Well conducted consultations in the view 
of the WB provide project affected people with a clear understanding of how they 
might be affected, changes that may result and meaningful ways to influence 
decision-making during project design and preparation. Additionally it also builds 
support for projects. Defining stakeholder representation is not considered 
necessary as long as views and opinions that are shared are relevant to the project. 
The need for guidance papers however, according to the WB, has arisen from 
non-compliance with Bank requirement on consultation and information 
disclosure recurring in investigations. It does however point out that the primary 
responsibilities for conducting consultations rest with the borrower, with the bank 
assigning itself a supervising role in ensuring that they are carried out (WB 2012, 
WB 2013). At the country level, CSOs were consulted on over 80 per cent of all 
WB Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) over the past years, encompassing 40 
countries (WB 2015f). 
 
Collaboration and partnerships 
One form of civil society “participation” which sets the WB apart due its role in 
development field is when a CSO fulfills the role of a service provider or 
implementer. CSO involvement in Bank-financed projects in 2012 were at 82 
percent, and the WB says it funds hundreds of CSOs each year directly through 
various mechanism, and thousand indirectly through government managed 
community driven development projects (WB 2015f) 
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The WB further states in its latest available report on civil society participation 
that it needs to find ways to increase CSO representation in governance structures 
“while taking into account civil society’s distinct institutional and representational 
role as a non-state actor” (WB 2012). In this respect, it has invited CSOs to serve 
as advisors or as full partners in governance structures of several funding 
mechanism (WB f, WB 2012:8). 
 
Stakeholder participation in PRSP and CAS processes 
A mediated form of civil society engagement is the one associated with 
governments processes of producing poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). 
For recipients of official development assistance (ODA), this is required by the 
WB and the IMF as a formal mechanism tied to assistance from the institutions. It 
ties the policy conditionality’s of the institutions to governments own strategies in 
which a focus on poverty reduction is promoted and often become a reference 
point for other donors as well. Through this process, and by including stakeholder 
and civil society participation as part of the process it is intended to foster local 
stakeholder ownership. Of the 28 PRSPs the WB received in 2010-2012, 
according to the WB all reported some form of civil society participation. In the 
Country Strategy papers the bank itself prepares, civil society participation is 
reported in 82 percent during the same period (WB 2012b). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Composite overview of civil society participation in WB 
 
Type  Frequency Participants/ 
Requirements 
Purpose Level Links to 
policy / 
decision-
making 
Information 
disclosure 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Transparency Not 
applicable 
No direct link 
Civil society 
policy forum 
Twice a year Registration and 
accreditation. 
Developed 
countries 
overrepresented  
Foster trust 
and 
understanding 
Global No direct link 
Consultation 
online 
Recurring Open to anyone Consultative Global consideration 
in  policy 
making 
Stakeholder 
consultations 
Encouraged 
in all new 
projects  
Adversely affected 
most  important 
Transparency/ 
Fostering 
ownership 
Country 
and project 
level 
Consideration 
in project 
decision 
Indirect 
stakeholder 
consultation in 
PRSP process 
Occurred in 
100% of 
PRSPs 2010-
2012 (latest 
data) 
unknown Fostering 
ownership 
Country Unknown 
Collaboration 
in 
implementation 
Unknown  Unknown Partnership Project/ 
country 
Unknown 
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4.2 The International Monetary Fund 
The conception of IMF, like the WB, dates back to the Bretton Woods conference 
in 1944, and like the WB is headquartered in Washington and has 188 members. It 
was envisaged as a framework for economic cooperation in light of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Its primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the 
international monetary system, i.e. exchange rates and payments. Its mandate was 
updated in 2012 and now includes all macroeconomic and financial sector issues 
relating to global financial stability (IMF 2015a).  
 
The IMF fulfills its responsibilities in three different ways. Firstly, through a 
surveillance mechanism by which the IMF reviews country policies as well as 
regional and global financial developments, advising member countries on policy. 
Secondly, through financial assistance to its members by way of various, often 
short term, financial support mechanisms and lending instruments which are 
subject to different qualifying requirements (IMF 2015a). In close cooperation 
with the IMF member countries which have received financial assistant are 
required to design adjustment programs, with continued financial support 
conditioned on effective implementation. Thirdly, the IMF provides technical 
assistance and training to strengthen member countries capacity in designing 
policies (IMF 2015a). 
 
The highest decision making body is the Board of Governors, with one Governor 
for every member, meeting once a year in conjunction with governors meeting of 
the WB. Voting power in the IMF was however designed to reflect relative 
positions of member countries in the global economy. Most of the powers are 
delegated to elected and appointed Executive Directors which make up the 
Executive Board, reflective of the governance structure of the WB, whereby five 
Executive Directors are directly appointed by the member countries holding the 
largest quotas. Chairman of the Executive Board and head of staff is a Managing 
Director appointed by the Executive Board (IMF 2015b) 
4.2.1 Civil society participation 
Some forms of civil society engagement by IMF reflect those of the WB as seen 
in Table 2. It also co-hosts the outreach events held in the spring and during the 
annual meeting of Governors of the institutions. Its managing director participates 
in the same session as the WBs President and the IMF co-funds grants for 
facilitating participation by CSO representatives from developing countries. The 
PRSP processes, when IMF is involved are likewise the same (WB 2015f, WB 
2015g, WB 2015h,WB 2012b). 
 
Just as the WB, the IMF also has an online portal for consultation where written 
comments can be submitted in relation to its policy and strategy papers following 
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set guidelines of specific question it seeks feedback on. Information is scarce on 
scope or frequency of this mechanism but of the consultations still posted online it 
has 2 for 2015, 3 from 2014, 3 from 2013, and 4 from 2012 (IMF 2015c, IMF 
2015d).  
 
What it does not seem to offer are local stakeholder or civil society consultations 
outside the PRSP framework. In its institutional language it does not make any 
references to stakeholders as the WB do either. The seminars and conferences it 
reports as being on the agenda on its website refer to intergovernmental meetings 
or with experts in the field (IMF 2015e). 
 
         
        Table 2. Composite overview of civil society participation in IMF 
 
 
4.3 The World Trade Organization 
The WTO consisting of 160 members and located in Geneva was created in 1995 
but traces its origins to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
the Uruguay round of trade talks which began in 1986 and culminated in 1994. It 
is the only global trade regime within which global rules for trade are negotiated 
and monitored. Apart from negotiating trade agreements in various areas, member 
countries also review each other’s trade policies. The WTO also includes a 
dispute settlement mechanism (WTO 2015a, Seth 2004). 
 
Type  Frequency Participants/ 
Requirements 
Purpose Level Links to 
policy and/or 
decision-
making 
Information 
disclosure 
Not applicable Not applicable Transparency Not 
applicable 
No direct link 
Civil society 
Program 
Twice a year Registration and 
accreditation. 
Developed countries 
overrepresented 
Foster trust and 
understanding 
Global No direct link 
Consultation 
online 
Recurring Open to anyone Consultative Global Consideration 
in policy 
making 
Indirect 
stakeholder 
consultation 
in PRSP 
process 
Occurred in 
100%  of 
PRSPs 2010-
2012 (latest 
data) 
unknown Fostering 
ownership 
Country Unknown 
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As opposed to the WB and the IMF, all members have one vote, but in practice 
decision are taken by consensus. Although previously a decision within the whole 
WTO used to be possible once the four biggest members including Canada, the 
European Union, the US and Japan had reached an agreement. The highest 
decision making body is the Ministerial Conference which meets at least once 
every two years. The day- to day work is carried out in three bodies with different 
functions but consisting of all the members; the General Council, the Dispute 
Settlement Body, and the Trade Policy review board. For each broad area of trade 
there are three councils reporting to the general council and with subcommittees 
reporting under them.  The secretariat headed by a director-general has a staff of 
around 677 responsible mainly for administrative and technical support (WTO 
2015a, Seth 2004). 
 
Agreements have rarely been reached in the formal settings but in discussions in 
smaller groups. As opposed to in the past, these meetings which can be called by 
chairs of meetings aimed at forging compromises have now reportedly become 
transparent, with regular reports back to the full membership (WTO 2015a). 
4.3.1 Civil society participation 
The various forms of contact between civil society and the WTO are shown in 
Table 3 and are commented on in what follows. 
 
Institutional provisions for participation 
The Marrakesh Agreement from 1995 establishing the WTO provisions for 
cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Under Article V.2 
“The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and 
cooperation with nongovernmental organizations concerned with matters related 
to those of the WTO.” In 1996, this was clarified by the General Council giving 
the Secretariat authority to establish direct contacts with NGOs. (WTO 2015b, 
WTO 2015c). 
 
NGOs can also receive accreditation for briefings on WTO issues and 
accreditation badges valid for one year which allows access the WTO building for 
specific events or meetings without having to register. Currently the WTO reports 
52 local NGO representatives as accredited (WTO 2015b). 
 
Information disclosure 
The WTO makes most of its documents available to the public as soon as they 
have been circulated, with a minority of restricted documents made available two 
months after they are derestricted. It currently has 150 000 documents available 
for download. A monthly electronic newsletter bulletin is also available (WTO 
2015). 
 
Public forum 
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The WTO hosts an annual Public forum for civil society, academia, business, 
government, parliamentarians and other institutions. Participation is subject to 
acquiring accreditation requiring that a concern with trade issues related with 
WTO can be shown. The WTO receives proposals for sessions of workshops and 
panel discussions to be led by participants but choses which, among the proposals 
it receives (WTO 2015b, WTO 2015d ). 
 
The forum itself has no direct links to any decision-making or policy processes 
and participants are reportedly to a significant degree representatives from think 
tanks and business associations (Vifell 2010:119). 
 
Registration of position papers 
NGOs can register position papers with the secretariat which compiles and 
circulates a monthly list to member governments (WTO 2015a). They do not 
seem to have any other link to policy- or decision-making processes however. 
 
Attendance at Ministerial Conferences 
NGOs can register for accreditation to attend WTOs Ministerial Conferences 
provisioned on satisfying criteria of concern with trade issues within the scope of 
WTO, although access is restricted to General Council meetings with restrictions 
on where they are allowed to be at the premises (WTO 2015e, Vifell 2010:117). 
Some have also detected asymmetries in participation between representatives 
from the North and South, as well as between business representatives and CSO 
(Steffek & Ehling 2008:104-106). 
 
Submission of amicus curiae briefs 
Third parties have been allowed to submit amicus curiae briefs in dispute 
settlement hearings. This is not explicitly provisioned for and there has been some 
ambiguity on the legal basis for it. The appellate body have gone against the panel 
– which first hears a case- however, and declared that it can accept or reject 
information it receives, whether it has been requested or not (Pandey 2013, Vifell 
2010:120, Steffek & Ehling 20008:106-107). 
 
Attendance at dispute settlement hearings 
NGOs can attend the public hearings of some dispute settlement proceeding, but 
information to which and why only “some” is not readily accessible (WTO 
2015b). 
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Table 3. Composite overview of civil society participation in WTO 
Type  Frequency Participants/ 
Requirements 
Purpose Level Links to 
policy 
and/or 
decision-
making 
Information 
disclosure 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Transparency Not 
applicable 
No direct 
link 
Public forum Once a 
year 
Registration and 
accreditation subject to 
approval as a concerned 
NGO  
 
NGOs, including 
academia, and business 
associations. Developed 
countries 
overrepresented. 
Business well represented  
 
Foster dialogue 
and exchange of 
views 
Global No direct 
link 
Registration 
of position 
papers 
Not 
applicable 
Unknown Dissemination 
of information 
Global No direct 
link 
Attendance at 
ministerial 
conference 
Biennial See “public forum”  Transparency Global No direct 
link 
Submission of 
amicus curiae 
brief  in 
dispute 
settlement 
Not 
applicable 
Unknown Admissible  Not 
applicable 
No direct 
link 
Attendance at 
dispute 
settlement 
hearings 
Unknown Unknown Transparency Not 
applicable 
No direct 
link 
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5 Analysis 
Do the institutions of global governance being examined here form part of a 
management mode of a social order by and for dominant social classes? If so, 
what are the conditions for marginalized and disempowered sectors to use forms 
of civil society participation in global governance as entry points for social 
change? 
 
Perhaps it is no coincide that IMF and the WB have mutual provisions allowing 
for attendance at each other’s decision making meetings, and that the IMFs by-
laws explicitly allow for the WTO secretariat to send an observer (IBRD 2012, 
IMF 2012, IMF 2015f) . Let us however turn to the second question which is the 
main concern. 
 
From the perspective of the problem in focus the overall picture speaks to an 
important and recurring issue posed in the literature on non-state actors in global 
governance. Who do non-state actors in global governance actually represent? In 
assessing the democratizing potential of CSO participation this is often a concern, 
just like actual degrees of influence (See for example Steffek & Nanz, 2008, 
Kissling & Steffek 2008).   
 
Addressing this within the context of this thesis inevitably at some point requires 
saying something on who traditionally disempowered and marginalized refers to. 
As initially stated however, a singular homogenous definition may be impossible, 
not necessarily desirable, but importantly, not ultimately needed for the problem 
at hand. It may be sufficient to speak of what the commonalities may be. These 
may for example include scarce monetary resources, low skills, low education, 
lack of access to information and infrastructure, poor social capital and so on. 
These characteristics’ may in turn be interrelated with exclusion from labor 
markets, from political life, as well as disconnection from capitals and major 
cities. 
 
In examining the modes of participation and engagement and comparing them to 
who they are aimed at, who might be able to access them and effectively 
participate, does this include those marginalized and disempowered sectors of 
society? In my view the assessment would mostly be that they do not offer 
effective modes of participation for these sectors of society. On the contrary 
arguably, they reinforce existing power asymmetries between elites, and 
marginalized sectors.  
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Let’s start with those most unattainable forms of participation, first however a 
comment on transparency in global governance which often features in the 
literature. In relation to discussions at hand, important as it is for legitimacy, it 
merely constitutes a basic enabler in this context. 
 
Now, let us look at something which the WB, IMF and WTO all share - an 
outreach event for civil society at a general level. These events are mostly hosted 
in Washington and Geneva. Although the WB and IMF have made grants for CSO 
representatives from developing countries to attend, there is a reported 
overrepresentation of representatives from developed countries. In the case of the 
WTO business association are as welcome as non-profit NGOs at these events and 
accreditation requires NGOs specifying the concern with trade matters in the 
realm of WTO agreements and negotiations. The same requirements are set out 
for attending WTOs Ministerial Conferences. None of the events are tied in with 
any policy or decision-making.  
 
Key in examining these instances of participation is whether they even amount to 
being accessible for disempowered and excluded sectors of society, even if 
loosely organized through CSOs?  Given the requirements, including technical 
proficiency to register for participation, acquire accreditation, and the resources to 
travel and stay in Washington or Geneva, it does not seem likely. 
Overrepresentation of well-funded CSOs and high degree of participation by 
business associations in WTOs events (Steffek & Ehling 2008) suggest they cater 
more to elites.    
 
Moving on, WTO offers NGOs to register position papers on trade topics with 
their secretariat in Geneva which does not appear to have any further implication. 
The WB and IMF have a more purposeful mechanism of active policy 
consultation online. Since these arguably require some policy proficiency as well 
as online access for WB and IMF consultations, it is likewise more likely to cater 
to more professional and elite parties. While it certainly allows for civil society 
feedback the threshold is certainly lowest for elite sectors thereby potentially 
reinforcing asymmetries. A mechanism concerned with participation by broader 
and especially marginalized sectors of society would, I argue have to be more 
proactive and maybe even targeted. Likewise, important as the possibility for 
NGOs to submit amicus curiae briefs in WTO dispute settlement hearings may be, 
it stands to reason that the thresholds are high for marginalized sectors to make 
use of it. 
 
What about when participation takes the form of a CSO in the role of implementer 
or service provider? In literature on non-state actor participation in global 
governance this is treated as strong incidence of participation (See for example 
Tallberg 2010), and institutionally it is. Likewise the WB, where this occurs, 
treats this as the form in which civil society reaches its strongest level of influence 
(WB 2012b).  
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However for the problem at hand it is problematic. Firstly, if we recall the 
operative questions used to assess forms of civil society participation which 
includes looking at the purpose and motive, in these cases the purpose is not to 
consult civil society, or to deliberate with it on its policies, the function is clearly 
to implement them. In and by itself it does not say anything about its implication 
for influencing policy at any overarching level, or even on country or project 
level. From the WB perspective it’s an explicit technique to foster what it calls 
“ownership”. 
 
This is a strong but double-edged concept which will merit some additional 
discussion, it suggest ownership by having a say, but also by just being coopted 
into a structure where in fact having a say is ultimately conditioned. As 
implementer in relation to the WB it may be a way of some influence in design 
and provision. However at the same time it stands to reason that influence in a 
significant scale by fulfilling this role may only possible for civil society when it 
is highly organized, arguably professionalized in the role of implementer, with the 
adequate time-resources and skills. Arguably this would exclude large sectors of 
civil society which are neither highly organized nor have the necessary resources. 
Before anything more can be said however specific attention would have to be 
paid in studying these instances. 
 
Returning to the term of ownership, this is a prominent driver in the mechanism of 
stakeholder participation used in the WB and IMF initiated PRSPs required of 
governments receiving development assistance by these organizations. In relation 
to the institutions it is an indirect form of civil society participation. By making 
governments responsible for owning the process of carrying out consultations 
with stakeholders, including civil society, it seeks to assure that the priorities are 
shaped and owned by the government, stakeholders and civil society, becoming a 
reference point for other donors (Lazarus 2008, Harman 2009). While it may seem 
a powerful instrument, the question is for whom? It has been criticized as a subtle 
form of control whereby these institutions can disassociate themselves from 
responsibility while at the same giving them the means of embedding similar type 
of policy conditionality’s as in previous structural adjustment programs which fell 
in disrepute. 
 
Lazarus for example points to this, and also cites others which go so far as to 
consider them to be a mere act and highly donor driven with more emphasis on 
the process itself than actual inclusive participation focused on the priorities. 
Moreover they are also criticized for attempting to depoliticize issues in the 
concerned countries which are in fact intrinsically subject to political conflict and 
thereby undermine legitimate political processes (Lazarus 2008). 
  
This can have wider implications tying in with the approach adopted by the WB 
of local stakeholder consultation in general. In light of the multiple forms of civil 
society participation practiced by the WB at different levels presented here, 
Harmans basic argument that using local modes of stakeholder consultation is 
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used by the WB to insulate it from any outside critique has severe implications 
(Harman 2009). While it is arguably important that consultations occur with 
stakeholders at local levels where it operates, it implies a severing of the links 
between the local and the global, and a compartmentalizing of issues. In essence, 
it can serve to disconnect local issues from broader strategic policy decisions and 
hide or condition political alternatives. The same goes for issue areas which 
obviously can be interrelated. 
 
While the WB thus has a wider array of forms through which it engages with civil 
society than others, if used in this way it can clearly present a form of actually 
asserting control. If this were to be the case, looking at its forms of civil society 
participation, it can easily acquiesce to CSO engagement for elites during its 
summits in Washington, and consult local stakeholders elsewhere without them 
having any comprehensive impact. 
 
Overall, what is noticeable is also the lack of civil society participation which 
could include broader and marginalized sectors of society. Given its local 
investments projects in the field of development the WB appears to have most 
presence through which it can interact with civil society. The problems that could 
arise if it compartmentalizes its contacts have been discussed, but for the IMF and 
the WTO one could envisage a thousand fold greater engagement. Both seem 
trapped in the perception, not only that they are accountable only to governments 
(IMF 2003) but also that they operate in affairs which are only a matter for 
governments. 
 
As regards the WTO, its small secretariat actually does very little of and by itself 
as it is the governments who negotiate, arbitrate and makes decisions. Not 
surprisingly the view taken is that beyond transparency, civil society should lobby 
its respective governments (Van den Bossche 2008, Pandey 2013). While macro 
policy, the area of the IMF, normally is a function executed by governments, the 
IMF actively advises and has by way of conditionality’s both the mandate and the 
power to see these policies implemented. Governments who do turn to the IMF 
may do so also in lack of choice and alternative. Importantly, the people who do 
suffer the busts of the economy or austerity measures and cut backs on social and 
public spending are real individuals and households, typically the most vulnerable 
and marginalized (Friedmann 1992), not a government.  
 
Nonetheless the IMFs institutional view is that while relations with civil society 
are important, the partner it is accountable to is the member country (IMF 2003). 
Thus, in one study Scholte for instance reports that even in cases where IMF has 
local staff and representatives in countries that could engage actively with local 
civil society this is simply not the case. Reportedly they many times fail to see 
what there could possibly be to talk about (Scholte 2012). Even while respecting 
the IMFs governance structure and its decision making process it is not beyond 
imagination that if nothing else, to improve and inform its policies and as a basis 
for decision it could take an interest in actually talking with broader sectors of 
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society, including those at the lower strata about the views they hold on the effects 
of the policies it recommends. This could even be done in collaboration with 
governments. 
 
In as much as IMF policies include austerity measures in relation to for example 
public spending while it rightfully may raise questions regarding macroeconomic 
instability, these concerns have to be considered in light of overall objectives and 
weighted against the cost of an exaggerated focus on controlling inflation which 
might imply having to tolerate high rates of unemployment (Sen 
1999:129,139,142). Moreover, while economic indicators may be important they 
do not necessarily say anything about actual disaggregated effects (See for 
example Friedmann 1992). 
 
Notwithstanding possible critique, in contrast with the IMF, the WBs more 
diverse and substantial forms of engaging civil society seems to reflect that it 
genuinely sees a civil society which arguably includes marginalized sectors of 
society as its stakeholders. Even if in part due to its policy area.  
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6 Conclusions and final remarks 
 Many of the “strongest” forms of civil society participation which at first glance 
seem promising for traditionally disempowered groups as actually constituting a 
way of having an influence, such as for example through stakeholder and civil 
society participation associated with PRSPs, are ambiguous. This is also the case 
in the strongest form of participation i.e. as provider or implementer.  
 
In the first case it is because of the risk of simple co-option whereby the policies 
of dominant social forces and ultimately social order remains intact, but subtly 
veiled through minor concessions.  In relation to participation as 
implementer/provider it is due to the ambiguity of the purpose and actual capacity 
of others than CSOs with resources and organization to effectively take advantage 
of it. 
 
In conclusion, this study has been in an immensely complex subject area in and by 
itself, with a potential for a multitude of levels of analysis and variables. The 
theoretical lens by which it has been critically examined similarly reflects this. In 
contrast the thesis operates within clear confines. It has thus been a clear 
compromise, extensive in neither depth nor aggregated quantities. Nevertheless, it 
presents a clear composite overview of civil society participation in global 
governance critically examined from the perspective of traditionally marginalized 
and disempowered groups, identifying a number of problems from this 
perspective for further detailed investigation. Both in terms of in-depth case 
analysis and in mapping links between community, local and global levels. In this 
sense this constitutes a preliminary contribution to that specific problem and to the 
wider subject area of non-state actors and global governance.  
 
Additionally, it has not only pointed at ambiguities, but also at mechanisms 
clearly enforcing power asymmetries, such as for example the arguably very 
narrow scope of civil society participation if compared to what could be envisaged 
which lead to high thresholds for marginalized groups to access them. As to the 
conditions for marginalized sectors of society to use civil society participation as a 
vehicle for change – as it stands, the assessment is not favorable. In terms of 
actual impact on policies and decision-making the discussion from the perspective 
of marginalized social groups certainly seem premature. Considering the available 
forms of civil society participation in global governance examined here, this 
might also be the case even when it comes to assessing their representation in 
them. 
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As regards commenting on it in neo-gramscian terms, even if civil society 
participation has evolved, in part as a response to try and improve transparency 
and democratic credentials, the result could be described as Cox (1995:44) put it 
“tinkering by the elites”. Maybe transformative change is not forthcoming when 
the elite “tinkers”, but when actual changes occur in the social base. 
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